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Investors’ Day in Chinese Court:  
Civil Compensation in Fraudulent Information Disclosure Cases 
 
The Chinese government’s ambition to build “a socialist system with Chinese 
characteristics” or socialist market economy is a new human invention. In this effort, 
China can borrow some experiences from mature market economy countries, but it will 
encounter unique problems. Only under this backdrop can we fully understand many 
legal concepts blended with hybrid of Chinese characteristics that may seem illogical to 
western readers.  Shed in such light, this note aims to explain the newly issued 
interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court on Civil Compensation Cases Involving 
Fraudulent Information Disclosure In the Securities Market.1 
This note argues that though the new interpretation is a big step toward investor 
protection, it will not be able to achieve its goal of establishing individual investors’ 
confidence. In interpreting the Securities Law, the Court played a role of poor legislature 
by compromising various special interests and serving the state’s goal. Lower courts 
have little discretion in their handling of such cases. Thus, it evidences China’s central 
planning mentality and distrust of judiciary branch.  Individual investors’ right to 
compensation is conditioned on the state’s public law enforcement, which can sway in 
the winds of public policy. Such a law will further discredit courts’ role in individual 
                                                 
1 Shao Zongwei, Civil Law on Fraud Evolves, China Daily, Friday, Jan. 10, 2003, available 2003 WL 
3052453. The Chinese text of the new interpretation is available online at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/sfjs/detail.php?id=45827. The English translation was completed by the author 
and not available to the public. 
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protection and hamper investors’ enthusiasm, which is contrary to the expressed goal of 
the Securities Law.2  
The note will first give a brief description of China’s securities market and 
development of securities law. Since the note focuses on the new interpretation, it will 
not expand to a discussion of the complexity of the market itself. Because the Supreme 
People’s Court interpreted the Securities Law when it applies to civil compensation 
cases involving fraudulent information disclosure, the note will discuss the relevant 
provisions of the Securities Law. The second part of the note will describe in detail the 
new interpretation. It will explain possible reasons behind some provisions and their 
implications to the securities market. Because Chinese securities law is indebted in part 
to the law in U.S., the note will try to elucidate some legal concepts in the Securities 
Law and the interpretation by looking at the U.S. leading cases. The note then 
concludes that for fear of instability the Supreme People’s Court again refused to take 
primary responsibility for protecting citizens’ rights.  
 
I. Development of Securities Market and Law in China 
Establishment of investor confidence and nourishment of the infant Chinese 
securities market are both complementary and conflicting in current China’s legal 
development. Securities markets in China are designed in part to draw in private 
                                                 
2 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa (Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China) 
(hereinafter the Securities Law) (passed Dec. 29, 1998 by the Ninth Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress in its sixth session, effective July 1, 1999), translated in CHINA L. & PRAC., Feb. 
1999, at 25, also available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/CSRCSite/eng/elaws .  The general preamble states 
that the purpose of the Securities Law is to regulate the issuing and trading of securities, to protect 
investors’ rights, to maintain social and economic order, to protect public interest, and to promote the 
development of socialist market economy. The Securities Law, Art. 1.  
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investors without ceding control of state-owned enterprises. 3 The government, state 
banks and state enterprises are the main issuers of securities and main shareholders.4 
Almost all the listed companies are the beneficiaries of the government favoritism.5  
China in 1983 converted for the first time a State Owned Enterprise ("SOE") into 
a stock corporation, issuing minority shares to private investors while the State 
maintained majority control. Such limited privatization at that time served the sole 
purpose of raising capital for the ailing SOEs.6 The Shanghai and Shenzhen National 
Stock Exchanges opened in 1990 and 1991 respectively. In order to insulate the 
domestic RMB market from volatility of the international capital market, domestic 
investors can only invest RMB in the A shares, whereas, foreign investors invest foreign 
currency in the B share market. The Shanghai and Shenzhen markets have grown 
significantly in their short history.  Today they have 1,200 listings, a market 
capitalization of around $500 billion, and some 66 million individual investors. 7  
In March 1987, China issued its first national securities regulation, "Interim 
Regulation Governing the Administration of Bonds for Enterprises."  In April 1993, China 
set up a two-tiered regulatory system comprised of the State Council Securities 
Commission ("SCSC') and China Securities Regulatory Commission ("CSEC"). The two 
commissions jointly drafted several regulations including the Interim Regulation on the 
                                                 
3 Gu Minkang & Robert C. Art, Securitization of State Ownership: Chinese Securities Law, 18 MICH. J. 
INT’L 115, 126.  
4 Cheng Tao & Bo Ruijian, Zhengquanfa Tonglun (General Introduction to Securities Law) 14 (1994).  
5 The Weakest Link, The Economist, A Survey of Asian Finance, 11, Feb. 8, 2003.  
6 Daniel M. Anderson, Taking Stock in China: Company Disclosure in China’s Stock Markes, 88 GEO. L. 
J. 1919, 1940 (2000) (asserting that China allowed the conversion of SOEs in the 1980s so that “idle 
personal savings could be channeled into ailing state enterprises”); Gu & Art, at 125 (noting that one 
purpose of the Chinese securities market is “to absorb money from Chinese citizens, which is then 
channeled into productive enterprises controlled by the state”); Matthew D. Latimer, Gilding the Iron rice 
Bowl: The Illusion of Shareholder Rights in China, 69 WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (1994) (discussing the 
fact the Chinese securities market developed out of a need “to obtain new sources of capital for Chinese 
industry and to relieve the state’s financial organs from the burden of finding investment funds’).  
7 The Weakest Link, 10.  
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Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks of 1993 and the 1993 Company law, 
as amended in 1999.  
In 1998, the Standing Committee of the People's Congress enacted the first 
systematic Securities Law. The system of investor protection, especially protection of 
small and medium-sized investors, is largely borrowed from developed countries.8 In its 
preamble, the Securities Law aims to regulate issuing and purchasing of securities and 
to protect investors' legal rights.9 The law requires listed companies’ continuous 
disclosure and forbids fraud, inside trading and market manipulation in issuing and 
trading securities. In Section 63, if the share prospectus, measures for offer of corporate 
bonds, financial or accounting report, listing report document, annual report, interim 
report or ad hoc report announced by an issuer or securities underwriting company 
contain or contains any falsehood, misleading statement or major omission, thus 
causing losses to investors in the course of securities trading, the issuer or the company 
shall be liable for the losses and the responsible director(s), supervisor(s) and/or the 
manager of the issuer or the company shall be jointly and severally liable for such 
losses.10  
The Securities Law authorizes the CSRC to pursue administrative action if an 
issuer of securities makes fraudulent disclosure in Section 177. If an issuer of securities 
fails to disclose information in accordance with relevant regulations or the information 
                                                 
8 In 1994, the CSRC and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission signed a memorandum 
of understanding that the SEC would assist China in developing its regulatory framework and drafting a 
body of national securities law. Gu Minkang & Robert C. Art, Securitization of State Ownership: Chinese 
Securities Law, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 124; Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Why Does Not the Rising Water 
Lift the Boat? Internationalization of the Stock Markets and Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 29 
INT’L LAW 615, 627 N. 58; China Securities Regulator to Visit Singapore, Hong Kong, THE STRAIGTS 
TIMES (Singapore), Nov. 30, 1995, Money at 2 (noting that China worked with Singapore, Hong Kong 
and the United States to develop its securities regulation). 
9 The Securities Law, § 1.  
10 The Securities Law, § 63. 
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disclosed contains a falsehood, misleading statement or major omission, the securities 
regulatory authority shall order the issuer to take remedial measures and impose a fine 
of not less than 300,000 Yuan11 but not more than 600,000 Yuan. The persons directly 
in charge and all other persons directly responsible shall be given a disciplinary warning 
and also be fined not less than 30, 000 Yuan but not more than 300,000 Yuan. If the 
offense constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to law.  
If the issuer fails to announce its listing documents or submit the relevant reports on 
schedule, the securities regulatory authority shall order it to take remedial measures 
and impose on it a fine of not less than 50,000 Yuan but not more than l00,000 Yuan.12 
However, this provision only allows administrative sanctions to the state 
regulatory authority and does not specify civil compensation action by injured investors. 
The fine is capped at 100,000 Yuan, which is de minimus compared to the loss injured 
investors suffered when their stock suddenly crashed.13 Zhu Shaoping, the chief of the 
National People’s Congress Financial and Economic Committee, said that the 
compensatory clauses in the existing law are too general to work. “A right is 
meaningless if it cannot be protected in legal proceedings,” complained Jiang Ping, a 
law professor who advocated judicial protection of stockholders.14 
Despite the enactment of the Securities Law, Chinese securities markets suffer 
rampant fraudulent disclosure. According to a study of companies listed on the 
Shanghai Securities Exchange, nearly fourteen percent of the items in the annual 
                                                 
11 Yuan is Chinese dollar and its exchange rate is 8.2772 per U.S. dollar in December 2002, 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/baogaoyutongjishuju/2002S5.htm 
12 The Securities Law, § 177.  
13 E.g.  363 shareholders of Yorkpoint Science & Technology demanded 24.6 million Yuan in a class 
action filed against the company for its institutional price manipulation.  China to Protect Stock Investors’ 
Interests, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200111/29/print20011129_85620.html 
14 China to protect stock investors.  
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reports were not acceptable.15 One commentator even suggested that currently most of 
the information disclosed was either incorrect or forged.16  
Investors welcomed the Securities Law that expressly imposes civil liability on 
issuers for fraud and brought lawsuits immediately after its enactment. However, to 
grievance of the injured investors, courts repeatedly refused to take jurisdiction over civil 
compensation cases brought by individual investors.  In 1996, Liu Zhongming brought 
the first civil action against Bohai Group for making fraudulent statement.17 The trial 
court ruled for the defendant and the appellate court affirmed. Again in 1998, several 
plaintiffs sued Hongguang Shiye for civil compensation, and the trial court of Shanghai 
Pudong New District dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
On September 21, 2001, the People’s Supreme Court told the lower courts to 
halt nearly 900 compensation cases regarding fraudulent statement, inside trading and 
market manipulation for further interpretation of the Securities Law.18 On January 15, 
2002, the Court publicized its opinion that lower courts have jurisdiction of civil 
compensation action involving fraudulent statement (1.15 Opinion). The 1.15 opinion 
opened floodgate for numerous such actions including several class actions. However, 
before the promulgation of the new interpretation, only two cases have been settled and 
the plaintiffs won the statutory compensation. One court dismissed a case without 
prejudice because not all defendants have been duly served with the CSRC’s 
administrative sanctions paper.  
                                                 
15 Tang Yuewei et al., Accounting and Finance in China 142 (3d. ed. 1994) 
16 See Han Zhiguo, "there is No basis for delisting in China," Shanghai Securities News, January 8, 2001. 
17 Gushi Huangyan Zhongxu “Nashui” -Zhuanjia Ping Sifa Jieshi (Lies in Securities Markets Should 
Finally Be “Taxed” – Experts Comment on the Judicial Interpretation), Economy Watch Journal, Jan. 13, 
2003, available at http://business.sohu.com/62/16/article205711661.shtml 
18 Court VP Lays Down Fraud Law, China Daily, Dec. 13, 2002, available at 2002 WL 103964416.  
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Such disregard of the Securities Law and slow recognition of investors’ rights by 
the Chinese judges is appalling when scholars and lawyers all agreed that strong 
financial markets depend on healthy investor psychology.19 Articles in Business Week, 
Financial Times, The New York Times attributed the inability of the stock market to 
stage a lasting rally to the fact that the scandals have offended investors so much that 
they are now unwilling to put their capital at risk any more.20 Investors are voting with 
their wallets and reevaluating the market downward to reflect their perception of real 
corporate profitability, trust and credibility.21 If China can boost its investor confidence in 
the domestic securities market, cash hungry companies, especially small to medium 
sized private companies, can tap the huge savings and spin off another expansion of 
industrialization. In 2002, the total savings account increased from 8567.44 billion Yuan 
to 94307.13 billion Yuan.22 On the other hand, those blue chip SOEs went offshore to 
other well regulated securities market. Mainland Chinese companies now make up 35% 
of Hong Kong’s stock market capitalization. In 2001-02 the mainland accounted for the 
biggest chunk of the world’s international share offers when giants such as China 
Mobile, China National Offshore Corporation and Bank of China listed in Hong Kong.23 
Because the securities market and privatization are new development only in 
recent years, the government and corporations do not have mature understanding of 
capital market. The old planned economy still has its legacy in their belief that 
                                                 
19 Lerach, at 120.  
20 “‘You can see it in the stock prices,’a hedge fund manager said.” Bowe & Chaffin, Problem for All of 
Corporate America, Knock-on Effects, FIN. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at 22.  
21 Anthony Bianco, The Angry Market, Investors Are Repricing Stocks to Reflect a More Honest Picture of 
Earnings, Options and the future, BUS. WEEK, July 29, 2002, at 32. 
22 Jin Rong Ji Gou Beng Wai Bi Shou Zhi Ping Heng Biao (2002) ( The Balance Sheet of Financial 
Institutions), available at  http://www.pbc.gov.cn/baogaoyutongjishuju/2002S0.htm 
23 the Weakest Link, 10. 
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corporations and their employees are the de facto owners. Even though the legal owner 
of companies before the reform are the state government, which is still true for State 
owned enterprises,24 managers and employees had great control of the companies 
because of life long employment and employment benefits including housing and 
medical benefits. Excessive government intervention often prevents the securities 
market from being self-regulated.  
Popular attitude towards privatization also hinders the due recognition of private 
rights. Zhengzhou Baiwen, a listed company once d as the stare of the department 
store sector and a model of reform for SOEs, fabricated statements using highly 
questionable accounting methods and was one.25 Only two years since its flotation in 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange, its annual sales halved to 3,360 million Yuan and 
recorded a loss of 523 million Yuan.26 On March 3, 2000, its biggest creditor Cinda 
brought bankruptcy action against Zhengzhou Baiwen.27 Anthony Neoh said that 
medium and small investors could sue the directors, but he also conceded that there 
was not specific law allowing such a civil action.28 Interestingly enough, Zhengzhou 
Baiwen’s employees companied: “we don’t understand why Cinda is trying to bring out 
company to an end . . . [W]e believe that Zhengzhou municipal government and Henan 
provincial government will not allow us to go bankrupt.”29 
                                                 
24 Cindy A. Schipani & Liu Junhai, Corporate Governance In China: Then And Now, 2002 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 1, 5 (asserting that “State ownership was considered the highest form of public ownership and 
the goal of socialism.) Schipani, at 5, fn. 6.  
25 Wei Xinjiang, People’s Republic of China: The Legal Features of Chinese Capital Markets in the Light 
of the Zhengzhou Baiwen Case, Comp. Law, 2002, 23(3), 100. 
26 Wei, at 101. 
27 Wei, at 101. 
28 Shi Zhengmao & Li Qiaoning, Anthony Nioh: Small and Medium-sized Investors Have the Right to 
Bring a Suit Against Zhengzhou Baiwen, FINANCIAL & ECONOMIC TIMES, Dec. 5, 2000. 
29 Guo Hongchao, ST Zhengzhou Baiwen Will Not Necessarily Go to Bankruptcy, FINANCIAL & 
ECONOMIC TIMES, Jan. 4, 2000.  
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The government and law makers see the securities market primarily as a good 
tool of the capital system to bail out the financially red SOEs.30 They do not view the 
common stock owners as ultimate owners of public companies; instead, they believe 
that investors make money by manipulating the stock market. The corporations use the 
stock market as a free ATM machine and their sole mission is to get listed by cooking 
books. Their stock price rarely reflects the return.31  Some scholars argued that without 
change of the government officials’ mindset inherited from the planned economy, the 
Chinese stock market will not be on the right track no matter how harsh the 
administrative or criminal penalty is.32  
On January 9, 2003, the People’s Supreme Court issued the long delayed 
Interpretation on Civil Compensation Concerning Fraudulent Information Disclosure in 
the Securities Market, which became effective on February 1, 2003.33 1.9 Interpretation 
supercedes and supplement the Notice the Court issued on January 15, 2002.34  The 
new interpretation expanded and clarified the 1.15 Opinion. To certain degree, the 
interpretation signals a turning point that law makers and judiciaries recognize that 
investors are the true owners of public companies and they should get compensated if 
their property rights are violated.  
II. The People’s Supreme Court’s Interpretation: Protection of Investors? 
A. Prerequisite conditions and Statute of Limitation 
                                                 
30  
31 Song Fengming (Professor in Tsinghua University Business School) & He Jia (Professor in Hong Kong 
Chinese University Business School), Gu Shi Ying Que Ding Tou Zi Zhe Ben Wei Xin Gai Nian (The 
Stock Market Should Adopt New Concept With Focus on the Investors), Zhong Guo Zheng Juan Bao 
(China Securities Journal), Feb. 22, 2003, available at 
http://www.cnstock.com/ztyj/hgjj/t20030222_377238.htm  
32 Song & He.  
33 (Hereinafter “1.9 Interpretation) Available at http://www.chinacourt.org/sfjs/detail.php?id=45827. Only 
Chinese version is available when this note is written.  
34 1.9 Interpretation, § 37.  
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We will see one of the most unique characteristics of Chinese law in the general 
provisions. The new law lists conditions before plaintiffs can bring civil actions. (1) the 
CSEC, its agencies, the Finance Ministry, or other administrative agencies with power 
of administrative sanctions publicize its decision of administrative sanctions against 
defendants or (2) the people’s court has convicted defendants for criminal charges. 35 If 
defendants appeal for reconsideration of the administrative sanctions or file an 
administrative action, the court may set aside the trial. If the administrative sanctions 
are vacated, the court shall dismiss the case with prejudice.36 Compared to the 1.15 
Notice, this new interpretation has expanded the court’s jurisdiction. The 1.15 Notice 
only allows civil action if the CSEC or its agencies have issued administrative sanctions 
against defendants. 
Thus, investors’ right to compensation is preconditioned on either defendants’ 
administrative sanctions or criminal conviction. Such an interpretation has no textual 
basis in the Securities Law and defies the authority of the Legislature. Section 63 of the 
Securities Law states that the issuer or the company whose reports “contains any 
falsehood, misleading statement or major omission, thus causing losses to investors” 
shall be liable for the losses and “the responsible director(s), supervisor(s) and/or 
manager of the issue or the company shall be jointly and severally liable for such loss.” 
The securities regulatory authority is required to supervise the reports37 and authorized 
to seek administrative sanctions against issuers for violation of the disclosure 
                                                 
35 1. 9 Interpretation, § 5(1)-(3).  
36 1.9 Interpretation, § 11. 
37 The Securities Law, § 65.  
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requirement.38  The individual rights maintaining civil action and the public law 
enforcement through administrative actions are parallel in the Securities Law.  
This provision will seriously inhibit proper enforcement of the Securities Law. To 
some degree, the new interpretation tries to strike a balance between protecting 
investors’ rights and limiting frivolous lawsuits. The same argument has been made in 
the U.S. when corporations, accounting firms, Wall Street bankers and big law firms 
lobbied the Congress to enact the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(“PSLRA”).  Proponents of the PSLRA argued that more onerous requirement of 
securities litigation would enhance capital formation, increase employment and benefit 
investors and the U.S. economy. 39 Within A few years after the enactment of the 
PSLEA, “the Chicken came home to roost.”  40 Even in the halcyon days of the late 
1990s there were a few people who warned that underneath the contemporary veneer 
of prosperity and profit laid widespread fraudulent profits, inflated asset values, and 
executive chicanery. According to the Wall Street Journal, “the companies currently 
listed on the market that symbolized the New Economy have not made a collective dime 
since the fall of 1995.”41  
Chinese government is notoriously infested with corruption. Though China has 
been trying to clean up its gigantic team of functionaries, the government is still running 
on “guanxi,” or personal relations.42 The CSRC, like other nations’ securities regulatory 
                                                 
38 The Securities Law, § 177. 
39 William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got Taken for Trillions by Corporate 
Insiders, 8 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 69, 78 (2002). 
40 Robert Southey, the Curse of Kehama (1810).  
41 Steve Liesman, Heard on the Street, NASDAQ companies’ Losses Erase 5 years of Profit, WALL ST. J. 
Aug. 16, 2001, at C1.  
42 Contact, Guanxi, and Dispute Resolution in China xviii (Tahirih V. Lee 1997) (defining “guanxi” as 
informal and personal relationships that cultivate mutual loyalty, and were formed to circumvent intrusion 
by the state); Jerome A. Cohen & John E. Lange, the Chinese Legal System: A Primer for Investors, 17 
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bodies, is so understaffed and poorly funded that frequent abuses are casually 
overlooked or inadequately investigated.43 Before the formation of CSRC, the People’s 
Bank of China (“PBC”), China’s central bank, was the regulatory body of the securities 
market.44 On August 10, 1992, local PBC officials conspired with the local governments 
and took for themselves share applications forms intended to be distributed to the public 
for sale.45 Such rampant corruption of the enforcement bodies will certainly slow down 
the cleansing process of the securities market.  
Under the new interpretation, investors’ claim against the market abuse flimsily 
depends on state’s law enforcement. Such a scheme may encourage further market 
abuse as long as the abusers can maintain guanxi with government officials. The CSRC 
claims to be the watchdog of the securities market, but like all other government 
branches in China its image in the general public is not transparent and fair in law 
enforcement. It is thus unlikely that this new interpretation will boost investors’ 
confidence.  
Only if we read the interpretation through the lens of Chinese culture and legal 
tradition can we understand the rationale behind the law. Ever since the Confucius 
                                                                                                                                                             
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 345. 349-50 (discussing the importance of guanxi within Chinese 
culture and the relations between government and private entities); Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial 
Restriction of Bribery: A premature Evocation of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 223, 
250 (1990) (noting guanxi is a network of personal relationships that the Chinese, among other cultures, 
are encouraged to use to achieve their objectives).  
43 Cohen & Lange, supra note, at 140 (noting the lack of resources available to develop the regulatory 
institution). 
44 Yao Chengxi, Stock Market and Futures Market in the People’s Republic of china xvii, 77 (1998); Qian 
Xuefeng, Transforming China’s Traditional Banking Systems Under the New National Banking Laws, GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 479, 486 (1996) (noting that the PBC 
45 Simon Holberton, Impasse or Impetus on the Road to Reform: Riots in Southern China Pose a 
Dilemma for the Leadership’s Programme of Liberalization, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 12, 1992 at 12 
(“Small investors were angry at having been allegedly cheated by corrupt officials out of the chance to 
participate in the local stock exchange’s latest round of share issues.”); Ann. P. Vandevelde, Realizing 
the RE-Emergence of the Chinese Stock Market: Fact or Fiction? 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 579, 592 
N. 74 (“Significant fraud and abuse occurred under the decentralized leadership of the PBC, prompting 
citizen riots in Shenzhen on August 10, 1992.”). 
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school dominated other philosophical schools, including the Legalist school, civil action 
did not develop as an independent body of law in China; rather, it served like a maid to 
the administrative and criminal law for the overall purpose of the empire’s stability. In 
Chinese dynasties, administrative courts and judicial courts were the same body and 
the head of each administrative court functioned as executive, judge and legislator.  
Private lawsuits were frowned upon in the public and discouraged by the government.  
The administrative court regarded parties to the lawsuit as “dadan diaomin” ( 
 
However, even with such daunting conditions for civil compensation, investors 
may find the law a big step toward endorsing their rights in court. In 2002 alone, the 
CSRC sanctioned seventeen companies, and investigated additional seventeen 
companies.46 The Ministry of Finance sanctioned four companies. Six companies are 
under criminal prosecution, of which one was found guilty at trial.  
B. Jurisdiction 
Court where the issuer or listed company is located has jurisdiction over such 
actions. If defendants are not issuer or listed company, court where defendant is located 
has jurisdiction. With defendant’s motion or all the plaintiffs’ consent, court can order the 
issuer or listed company to join as co-defendants and remove the case to the court with 
jurisdiction over the issuer or listed company.  Without defendant’s motion or plaintiff’s 
consent, court may order the issuer or listed company to join but shall not remove the 
case. 
                                                 
46 Shangzhengbao Touzizhe Weiquan Zhiyuantuan Xujia Chengshu Minshi Peichang An Redian 
Zuizhong (Shanghai Securities Journal Investor Protection Legal Aid Volunteers Report on Civil 
Compensation in Fraudulent Disclosure Cases), Shanghai Securities Journal,  
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Thus, in most cases, plaintiffs have to file their complaints in courts of the issuer 
or listed company. This new interpretation hampers investors’ ability to see wrongdoers. 
Given China’s vast geographic area and uneven development of judicial system, 
individual investors will probably find it economically infeasible to travel thousands of 
miles for a few thousand dollars. This new interpretation puts the burden on plaintiffs 
when defendants are usually big corporations with superior resources.  
It is also clear that the People’s Supreme Court regards the issuer of listed 
company primarily responsible for the wrongdoing, or believes that the issuer of listed 
company has been unjustly enriched from others’ wrongdoing. Lower courts have 
substantial discretion to join the issuer of listed company in civil compensation actions.  
C. Defendants 
Defendants in fraudulent disclosure civil action include: 
(1) promoter, control shareholders; 
(2) issuer or listed companies; 
(3) securities underwriter 
(4) persons who recommended the securities 
(5) accounting firms, law firms, asset evaluator  
(6) directors, supervisors, managers and other senior management persons of the 
above entities.   
(7) Catchall provision. 
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In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling that law firms, accountants, 
banks, and others who knowingly “aid and abet” a securities fraud are not liable under 
federal law.47 
In the Securities Law, it is prohibited for state functionaries, employees of the 
news media, stock exchange, securities companies, securities registration and clearing 
institutions, securities trading service organizations and public intermediary 
organizations and their employees, as well as the Securities Industry Association and 
the securities regulatory authority and their staff members to fabricate and disseminate 
false information, thereby seriously affecting securities trading.48   
D. What constitutes fraudulent statement 
(1) Fabricated: when a person with duty to record state non-existing facts in the 
disclosure documents 
(2) Misleading: when a person in the disclosure statement or in the media makes 
statements which significantly causes investors make wrong judgment in their 
investment 
(3) material omission: when a person with duty to disclose does not in disclosure 
documents wholly or partially record facts that should be recorded.  
(4) nondisclosure: a person with duty to disclose does not disclose information within 
the deadline.  
This new interpretation does not materially expand the duty of disclosure set forth 
in the Securities Law. Under Article 59, the documents for the issuing and listing of 
shares or corporate bonds announced by companies shall be truthful, accurate and 
                                                 
47 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).  
48 The Securities Law, § 72-. 
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complete; they may not contain any falsehoods, misleading statements or major 
omissions.  
In Section 60, Companies whose shares or bonds are listed for trading shall, 
within two months following the end of the first held of each fiscal year, submit to the 
securities regulatory authority under the State Council and the stock exchange an 
interim report with the following contents and announce the same: 
(1) the company's financial and accounting reports and business situation; (what 
accounting principles?) 
(2) major litigation involving the company; 
(3) the particulars of any changes in the shares or corporate bonds already issued; 
(4) any important matters submitted to the shareholders' general meeting for 
consideration; and 
(5) other matters specified by the securities regulatory authority under the Sate Council. 
Article 61, Companies whose shares or bonds are listed for trading shall, within four 
months following the end of each fiscal year, submitted to the securities regulatory 
authority under the State Council and the stock exchange an annual report with the 
following contents and announce the same: 
(1) a brief account of the company's general situation; 
(2) the company's financial and accounting reports and business situation; 
(3) a brief introduction to the directors, managers and the senior management persons 
and information with respect to their shareholdings; 
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(4) the details of shares and corporate bonds already issued, including the name list of 
the 10 shareholders who hold the largest numbers of the shares in the company and the 
number of shares by each of them; and 
(5) other matters specified by the securities regulatory authority under the State Council. 
Section 62, when a major even occurs that may considerably affect the price at 
which a listed company's shares are traded and that is not yet known to the investors, 
the listed company shall immediately submit an ad hoc report on the details of such 
major event to the securities regulatory authority under the State Council and to the 
stock exchange and make the same known to the general public. In the report the 
essence of the even shall be stated clearly. 
For purpose of the preceding paragraph, the term "major event" means: 
(1) a major change in the company's business guidelines or scope of business; 
(2) a decision made by the company concerning a major investment or major asset 
purchase; 
(3) conclusion by the company of an important contract which may have an important 
effect on the company's assets, liabilities, rights, interests or business results; 
(4) incurrence by the company of a major debt or default on an overdue major debt; 
(5) incurrence by the company of a major deficit or incurrence of a major loss exceeding 
10 percent of the company's net assets; 
(6) a major change in the external conditions of the company's production of business; 
(7) a change in the chairman of the board of direction, no less than one third of the 
directors or the manager of the company; 
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(8) a considerable change in the holdings of shareholders who each hold not less than 5 
percent of the company's shares; 
(9) a decision made by the company to reduce its capital, to merge, to divide, to 
dissolve, or to apply for bankruptcy; 
(10) major litigation involving the company, or lawful cancellation by a court of a 
resolution adopted by the shareholders' general meeting or the board of directors; 
(11) other events specified in laws or administrative regulations. 
The PSLRA of 1995 the “safe harbor” eliminates liability for even intentionally 
false financial projections and forecasts.49 The new interpretation does not reserve any 
safe harbor for false information. If the company makes statements that will significantly 
cause investors to make wrong judgment, the company is guilty for making misleading 
statement.  
E. Loss Causation 
Elements of Causation 
(1) the securities that plaintiffs invest must have direct relationship with fraudulent 
statement 
(2) plaintiffs bought the securities between the date when the fraudulent statement 
was made and the date when the statement was exposed or corrected. 
(3) Plaintiffs suffer loss when they sell the securities or keep holding the securities. 
The court will not find loss causation if  
(1) plaintiffs sold the securities before the date when the statement was exposed or 
corrected 
(2) plaintiffs invested after the date when the statement was exposed or corrected. 
                                                 
49 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f) 
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(3) Plaintiffs invested despite their knowledge of fraudulent statement 
(4) the loss is wholly or partly caused by the securities market’s system risk. 
(5) Malicious or manipulative investment. 
Fraudulent statement is exposed in national media such as newspaper, journal, 
radio, TV. Fraudulent statement is corrected when defendants voluntarily announce 
correction in the media that the CSRC designated as a reporter of the market 
information.  
It is not hard to imagine the following scenario.  An investor bought the securities 
before the date when the fraudulent statement was made. When the media exposed the 
fraudulent statement or the CSRC initiated an administrative action against the listed 
company for the wrong doing, its stock plummeted to a price even lower than prior to 
the time when the fraudulent statement was made. Under the new interpretation, the 
investor cannot sue the listed company for compensation because the second element 
was not met.  
The most troubling and criticized provision is that court cannot find loss causation 
if plaintiffs sold the securities before the date when the statement was exposed of 
correct. ST50 Dongfang (East) is a good example to analyze this issue. ST Dongfang 
was a blue chip stock before the sudden plunge of its price. Between July 16, 2001 and 
September 10, 2001, its stock price decreased about 50% from 17.44 Yuan51 to below 9 
                                                 
50 Unprofitable companies will have “special treatment” by the CSRC and “ST” is placed before the 
company symbol. The price of ST stock can only change five percent over or under the previous day’s 
closing price. Shanghai Stock Exchange Stock Listing Regulations, §§ 9.1.1-3, 
http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/flgz/html/t23001.htm#9, see also, Forced delisting rules may be too 
strict for investors, South China Morning Post, Feb. 27, 2001, available at 2001 WL 14784278. 
51 Yuan is Chinese dollar and its exchange rate is 8.2772 per U.S. dollar in December 2002, 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/baogaoyutongjishuju/2002S5.htm 
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Yuan.52 The company made three public announcements. On July 25, 2001, it said that 
“up till now, the company has disclosed all required information. It will honor its duty of 
disclosure and disclose the company’s information completely, accurately and 
punctually.” However on September 10, the company announced that it was under 
investigation by the CSRC and cautioned its investors against investment risk. On 
October 15, the company again announced that it had problem in information disclosure 
and profit determination, and the investors should follow the CSRC’s investigation.  
Under the new interpretation, the ST Dongfang’s investors must prove that they 
did not sell stock before the date when ST Dongfang corrected its wrongdoing or its 
wrongdoing was exposed in the media even though the CSRC had initiated its 
administrative action and ST Dongfang’s three officers received criminal conviction.53 
The question thus becomes which date is the exposure or correction date. Some 
investors might be more experienced and started selling their stock when they saw the 
July 25 announcement. The July 25 announcement is hardly a correction or exposure of 
fraudulent statement.  Even September 10 is not the exposure or correction date. Thus, 
those injured investors who sold before these dates cannot have a claim against ST 
Dongfang even though the company has made fraudulent statement. The new 
interpretation focused instead on the exposure or correction, not the wrongdoing itself. 
Such a scheme further encourages the insider information and market manipulation 
since investors raced to dump their stock due to the uncertainty of civil compensation at 
court. On the other hand, this interpretation also signals that investors should not sell 
their stock when the stock price goes down. They should keep the stock and wait for 
                                                 
52 Peoples Daily, Jan. 24, 2003, available at http://www. 
peopledaily.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20030124/913695.html. 
53 People Daily, Jan. 21, 2003.  
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administrative action. Such a scenario is unrealistic and counter-productive. Individual 
investors cannot foresee that every price fluctuation is caused by fraudulent statement. 
The inefficient and corrupt government law enforcement and unpredictable civil action 
further make this new interpretation harsh to individual investors.  
Furthermore, this loss causation element induces wrongdoers to postpone the 
announcement or to use ambiguous words so that they may argue in the court that the 
correction or exposure date is much later and those who sell their stock before that date 
do not meet the loss causation element. When the wrongdoers know the investigation 
by the CRSC is imminent, they can make numerous announcements in the media 
hinting that they are in some trouble but never expressly admit their wrongdoing. Most 
reasonable investors probably would have sold their stock before the CRSC’s formal 
investigation.  Thus, in the end, the wrongdoers can reduce the amount of damage 
claim to minimum.  
One securities lawyer involved in these cases estimated that plaintiffs in10-30% 
of the almost 900 pending cases would not be able to prove the loss causation.54 In one 
such case, plaintiffs sold their stock before the fraudulent disclosure was exposed when 
the CRSC issued its administrative sanctions against Sanjiu Yiyao Limited Co. for failing 
to disclose its 16.9 billion Yuan transaction and transfer of 1.243 billion Yuan to its 
subsidiaries. The six plaintiffs had voluntarily moved to dismiss the case.55  
Before the promulgation of the new interpretation, one Justice of the Supreme 
People’s Court remarked that “when calculating the losses of the investors, judges 
should be able to distinguish between the fluctuation of stock prices caused by the 
                                                 
54 Guo Ji Jin Rong Bao (International Finance) C-7, Jan. 23, 2003, available at 
www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20030123/913069.html. 
55 Guo Ji Jin Rong Bao, Jan. 23, 2003.  
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dissemination of fraudulent information and that caused by other elements.”56  To the 
contrary, the new interpretation arbitrarily decides that losses are not caused by “the 
dissemination of fraudulent information” if investors sell their stock before the exposure 
or correction of the fraudulent information. Such a scheme can help speedy trial 
considering the inexperience of lower court judges. However, a law that does not 
correctly reflect the social reality can dangerously lead the public to lose confidence in 
rule of law, when China is transforming from rule of man to rule of law.  
F. Liability57  
Defendants are jointly and severally liable. The new law imposes strict liability on 
the promoter, issuer or listed company. All other defendants are not liable if they can 
prove their innocence in the wrongdoing.   
Directors, executives, managers and other higher level managerial employees of the 
defendant companies are jointly liable with their companies if they: 
(1) participate in making the fraudulent statement; or 
(2) know or should know the fraudulent statement but do not expressly oppose the 
statement; 
(3) catchall provision. 
The Securities Act of 1933 and 1934 create an extensive scheme of civil liability. 
Private plaintiffs may sue under the express private rights of action contained in the 
Acts and under private rights of action implied by the terms of §10(b) of the 1934 Act. 58  
The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 in 1942, which cast the proscription of §10(b) in similar 
                                                 
56 Court Vice-President Lays Down Fraud Law, China Bus. Info. Network P13, Dec. 13, 2002, available at 
2002 WL 101713657.  
57  
58 Superintendent of Ins. Of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13, n. 9 (1971).  
 23
terms.59 The U.S. Supreme Court however held that private plaintiffs may not bring a 
10b-5 action for acts not prohibited by the text of 10(b) and in cases considering the 
scope of conduct prohibited by 10(b) emphasized adherence to the statutory language, 
“the starting point in every case involving construction of a statute.”60 The Court rejected 
the SEC’s argument that the broad congressional purpose behind the 1934 Act to 
protect investors from false and misleading information suggested that negligent act 
could violate 10(b).61 The Court reasoned that the use of words “manipulative,” “device,” 
and “contrivance” denotes an unmistakable congressional intent that the 10(b) only 
proscribed “intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors.”62  
The new Chinese law holds the issuer or listed company strictly liable for any 
falsehood, misleading statement or major omission. The law thus does not require 
scienter of the issuer company. Such an interpretation may seem harsh on its surface, 
but it has reasonably presumed fraud on the part of the defendant company when 
courts only take jurisdiction over cases in which defendant companies already have 
                                                 
59 Section 10(b) states:  
 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange— 
 (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device ot 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe. 
15 U.S.C. 78j. 
Rule 10b-5 states: 
 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1993).  
60 Ernest & Ernest, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).  
61 Ernest & Ernest, at 198.  
62 Ernest & Ernest, at 198.  
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administrative sanction or criminal conviction. Considering the rampant fraud in 
information disclosure in the Chinese securities market, only serious violators can get 
the CSRC’s attention.  Another factor for this seemingly harsh interpretation is that 
lower Chinese courts are often unfamiliar with the complicated Securities law and 
incompetent to judge scienter.63 Strict liability at least guarantees injured investors 
compensation from the enriched listed companies.  
G. Damages 
  If the fraudulent statement causes the securities to be delisted, plaintiffs shall get 
back the price they paid for the securities plus interest. Plaintiffs’ damage in the civil 
action is limited to the actual loss.  
Conclusion 
Stability has always been a major concern of every government in Chinese 
history. It is now an obsession when the economic reform disenfranchised a large 
proportion of population and new social order is still in its nascent formation. The 
Supreme People’s Court joined the government for the common goal of social stability 
by authorizing individuals to voice their rights under limited conditions. The 
interpretation conditions individuals’ rights on administrative action and criminal 
conviction of defendants. Such an interpretation has no textual basis in the Securities 
Law and evidences a quasi but incompetent legislative role the Supreme People’s Court 
played in balancing individual rights and state interest.  Redrafting by the Court will 
disrupt the systematic law the Securities Law aims to create and renders investors and 
companies disrespectful of the law. Though the Supreme People's Court is responsible 
                                                 
63  
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to the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee,64 the Court here again 
aligns itself with the administrative body.  
 
                                                 
64 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Art. 128, available at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/ constitution.html 
